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I. INTRODUCTION
A novel approach to the estimation of an element of a damage
award has recently been proposed in the courts throughout this coun-
try. "Hedonic damages" as confronted by the judicial system involves
an attempt to place a monetary figure on the value of the loss of
enjoyment of life. In 1982, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held that the loss of enjoyment of life was a separate and
distinct element of damages which a jury may award an injured plain-
tiff. With that guidance from the court, and through further experimen-
* Douglas L. Price, formerly an attorney with the law firm of Schrader, Byrd,
Byrum & Companion, in Wheeling, West Virginia, currently and attorney the law firm of
Anstandig, Levicoff, & McDyer, P.C. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The views expressed in
this Article are not necessarily those of the firm, or their clients. Mr. Price would like to
thank James F. Companion, Esq., Patrick S. Casey, Esq., and Elizabeth Uscio for their help
in putting this Article together.
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tation in the calculation of damages, the latest theory to be confronted
by the West Virginia courts has been the concept of hedonic damages.
In Flannery v. United States,1 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia recognized loss of enjoyment of life as a separate ele-
ment of damages which can be awarded by the trier of fact in the
courts of West Virginia. Since Flannery, from emerging case law, the
term hedonic damages has been used and interpreted to represent not
just the loss of enjoyment of life, but an economic principle of mathe-
matical calculation and measurement by an economist of a dollar fig-
ure put on an individual's "lost enjoyment of life"-an element of
damage typically thought to be within the province of the jury.
The term hedonic damages itself was first suggested by economist
Stanley Smith in the case of Sherrod v. Berry.2 Hedonic damages
derives its name from the Greek word "hedonikos" meaning pleasure
or pleasurable.3 As interpreted by the courts around the United States,
hedonic damages means either a loss of enjoyment of life or loss of
life's pleasures
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not yet ad-
dressed the propriety of expert testimony on hedonic damages.5 It will
1. 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982).
2. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), af'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated,
835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d
802 (7th Cir. 1988). Stanley Smith is president of Corporation Financial Group of Chicago.
He and Michael Brookshire coauthored the book Economic/Hedonic Damages: A Handbook
for Plaintiff and Defense Attorneys (1990). Michael Brookshire is a forensic economist based
in Charleston and Dunbar, West Virginia.
3. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 840 (2d ed. 1983).
4. See James Brady, Comment, Hedonic Damages, 59 Miss. L.J. 497 (1989);
Gretchen L. Valentine, Comment, Hedonic Damages: Emerging Issue in Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Claims, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 543, 546 n.13 (1990). In fact, it is still in
dispute as to the actual meaning of hedonic damages as used by the courts. Additionally,
some predict that it will be many years before the term is fully and completely defined.
For the purposes of this Article, the terms "loss of enjoyment of life," "loss of the value of
life," "loss of the pleasure of life," and "hedonic damages" will be used interchangeably as
the definition is not yet solidly defined, nor is it in its final form. Brady, supra, at 544-46
nn.6-13.
5. Yet, as this Article goes to publication, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has accepted for appeal the case of Liston v. West Virginia Univ., No. 922112
(W. Va. filed Nov. 23, 1992), wherein the court has decided to answer the following as-
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be the purpose of this Article to trace the use of hedonic damages
through state and federal case law, and to analyze West Virginia case
law which has interpreted loss of enjoyment of life as an element of
damages. Hedonic damages will also be viewed within the framework
of how it has been introduced and confronted in personal injury ac-
tions and wrongful death actions.6 Additionally, the principles which
underlie the presentation of hedonic damages will be examined. Con-
sideration is given to the arguments for and the objections against the
admissibility of quantifying hedonic damages from both the plaintiff
and defense perspectives.
II. FLANNERY AND Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LiFE
On October 27, 1974, Michael Flannery was driving his automo-
bile in Huntington, West Virginia, when his vehicle was struck by an
automobile owned by the United States Government and operated by a
government employee in the normal course of employment.7 Michael
Flannery was left permanently semi-comatose as a result of the injuries
signment of error: "The trial court erred in permitting plaintiffs' economic expert to testify
on the monetary value of plaintiffs' 'loss of enjoyment of life,' in clear contravention of
well-established West Virginia law which holds that any testimony which attempts to place
a value on an item of intangible damages by use of a mathematical formula is inadmissi-
ble." Brief for Appellant, Liston v. West Virginia Univ., No. 922112 (filed Nov. 25, 1992).
6. In addition to personal injury and wrongful death actions, hedonic damages have
been used persuasively in civil rights actions under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones' Act
cases and Warsaw Convention cases. The most often-cited case used to support an argument
for hedonic damages is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Rights Action, Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F.
Supp. at 159. It must be noted that the Sherrod case was based on strict statutory interpre-
tation that "§ 1983 permits recovery on behalf of the victim's estate for the loss of life."
Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 205. As will be explained more thoroughly later in this Article, §
1983 damages are more clearly delineated and specifically statutorily provided which sepa-
rates Sherrod from the typical personal injury or wrongful death action.
For other types actions in which hedonic damages were introduced, but will not be
discussed in this Article, see Badeaux v. Rowan Co., No. CIV.A.90-756, 1991 WL 195469
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1991) (Jones Act case), In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September
1, 1983, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Warsaw Convention and wrongful. death ac-
tion); Wasson v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-208V, 1992
WL 26662 (Cl. Ct. Jan. 2, 1992) (Vaccine Act case).
7. Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d. 270, 271 (4th Cir. 1981).
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received in this accident.' After administrative procedures were insti-
tuted and exhausted, a complaint was filed in federal district court and
tried without a jury to determine the government's liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.9 The court found the government negligent
and included in its award $1,300,000 for the "impairment of
Flannery's capacity to enjoy life."10 The government appealed on two
grounds, only the first being pertinent to this Article." The appeal
asked if impairment of one's capacity to enjoy life is an element of
pain and suffering and, if so, is it like pain and suffering which is
dependent upon Mr. Flannery's ability to sense and experience pain in
order to be awarded.12 The Fourth Circuit, after a review of West
Virginia case law, indicated that West Virginia did recognize the im-
pairment of one's capacity to enjoy life as an element of damages, but
was unsure whether a semi-comatose plaintiff would be entitled to
recover for that injury.1 3 Accordingly, the federal court certified the
question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: "Under
West Virginia law, is a plaintiff in a personal injury action, who has
been rendered permanently semi-comatose by his injuries and is there-
fore unable to sense his injuries, entitled to recover for the impairment
of his capacity to enjoy life?, 14
In answering the certified question, the West Virginia Supreme
Court first reviewed the basic principles for awarding damages, holding
that when awarding damages, the basic goal is to compensate the
plaintiff fairly and adequately for the injuries and losses sustained."5
The court noted that there are two basic categories to compensate a
personal injury: tangible and intangible damages. Tangible damages,
8. Id
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1988).
10. Flannery, 649 F.2d at 271.
11. The second appealed ground not relevant to this Article asked: "Under West Vir-
ginia law, must the trial court, when sitting as the finder of fact in a personal injury ac-
tion, deduct from the plaintiff's award for lost earning capacity an amount equal to the
federal income taxes which would have been levied upon such income had it actually been
earned?" I& at 273.
12. Id at 272.
13. Id
14. d at 273.
15. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982).
1058 [Vol. 95:1055
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also known as liquidated or pecuniary damages, "represent some form
of expense or economic loss that can be rendered reasonably certain
monetarily by a mathematical figure or calculation." 16 Included within
tangible damages are present and future medical, hospital, nursing,
dental, drug, and all other similar expenses for treating, curing, and
alleviating the plaintiff's physical and mental injuries. Also, included in
this category are lost wages and lost earning capacity. 7 The second
category of compensatory damages, intangible damages, is better
known as unliquidated or general damages, "in the sense that there is
no precise monetary calculafion that can be used to determine the
amount of the loss. The most obvious of these is pain and suffer-
ing." 18
The Flannery court next looked to make sure that a permanent
injury is firmly established before it allowed future expenses or dam-
ages to be awarded to allow one to function as a whole person."'
After permanency was established, the court proceeded to explore this
new award of damages in determining whether loss of enjoyment of
life can be awarded to a plaintiff who is not conscious of the fact that
he has lost the ability to enjoy life. The court held that knowledge of
the extent of loss of enjoyment of life is not a prerequisite because the
underlying function of an award for loss of enjoyment of life is to
measure the degree of permanent disability to the whole person arising
from the injuries inflicted.2' The court noted that being conscious or
having subjective knowledge of a permanent injury is not required,
citing an example of an infant who has been blinded by excessive
amounts of oxygen administered in an incubator. The infant still loses
the "loss of enjoyment of life," even though the infant's ability to
comprehend the loss of enjoyment of life is minimal.2
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The court also noted that "[t]he two broad categories of personal injury dam-
ages, liquidated and unliquidated, can also be subdivided as to those damages which have
presently accrued at the time of the trial and as to those which will necessarily be incurred
in the future." Id. at n.3.
19. Id. at 436.
20. Id. at 438.
21. Id. at 438. The court also noted:
105919931
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Ill. PROGRESSION OF Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE
West Virginia has been somewhat- fortunate to have a court ex-
press in such specific terms that loss of enjoyment of life is a separate
compensable element in a damage award and clearly not part of pain
and suffering.'2 As noted earlier, the term hedonic damages first ap-
peared in 1985 in a case asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Sherrod v. Berry.2 3 The Sherrod case involved a civil rights suit
[I]t is obvious that the loss of enjoyment of life is directly linked to the perma-
nency of the plaintiff's injury and a jury in evaluating the nature and degree of
the permanency of the plaintiff's injury will ascertain how such injury has affected
his ability to perform and enjoy the ordinary functions of life. This loss of capaci-
ty to enjoy life is not a function of pain and suffering in the traditional sense of
those words since one can lose his eyesight or a limb and be without physical
pain. Yet, it is obvious that such injuries will impair the person's capacity to
enjoy life.
Id at 437.
22. The issue of whether loss of enjoyment of life should be a separate cognizable
award has been debated by many courts across the country. There are three basic positions
with regard to the loss of enjoyment of life as a separate recognizable category of injury.
A minority of jurisdictions refuse any recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. Most
of these jurisdictions, however, base their positions on decisions rendered at the
turn of the century that largely have been ignored. The majority position allows
consideration of loss of enjoyment of life, but only as one of the numerous factors
characterizing a general damage award for pain and suffering. Finally, proponents
of a third position assert that loss of enjoyment of life is a proper element of
damages, separate and distinct from pain and suffering, for which compensation
should be awarded. The current debate surrounding loss of enjoyment of life cen-
ters around whether it should be treated as an integrated element of pain and suf-
fering or as an independent element of -damages.
Carleton R. Cramer, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damag-
es, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 967 (1981).
23. 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aft'd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). As noted earlier, the distinguishing factor of
the Sherrod case is that:
A § 1983 action is a suit for tort damages, even though the duty the defendant is
alleged to have breached is created by the Constitution or federal law . . . . This
section was enacted by Congress to protect individuals against invasions of feder-
ally guaranteed rights through the misuse or abuse of powers derived from the
state, . . . and to furnish a damage remedy, where proof is made, to those whose
civil rights are violated but who cannot get relief in the courts or agencies of
their state . . . . The basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to
compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
1060
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brought by the decedent's father to recover damages for the death of
Ronald Sherrod who was shot and killed by a city police officer.'
Stanley Smith, an economist from the University of Chicago, was
called to testify as an expert witness for the plaintiffs. Professor Smith
used questionnaires, government spending data, private spending data,
and income compensation studies to quantify a monetary figure for the
hedonic value of life. In the end, the district court allowed expert
testimony to place a figure on the hedonic damages, holding that
"[e]vidence of all the facts and circumstances of the case having any
legitimate tendency to show the damages, or their probable amount,
may be admitted for the purpose of enabling the jury to make the
most accurate and probable estimate that the nature of the case per-
mits." 5 Professor Smith testified from the guidelines he introduced
that economists can look "at how society values what we call the
hedonic aspect, the hedonic value of life, separate from economic
productive value of an individual., 26 Although the mathematical for-
mulas were not revealed in the Sherrod opinion, Professor Smith later
stated that he did base his estimates for the value of hedonic damages
rights . . . . It is well-established in this and other circuits that on the facts al-
leged, and on the evidence the jury heard, the estate of Ronald Sherrod could sue
and recover damages for the loss of his life.
Id. at 163 (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984));
O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va.
1981); c.f. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Although the Sherrod case is the most often cited case to support an argument to
warrant a recovery of hedonic damages, it must be noted that Sherrod is not a typical
personal injury or wrongful death action, but a civil rights suit brought under federal statute
which specifically provides for the award of hedonic damages.
24. Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 163.
25. Id at 164. Additionally, the court held:
The fact that the hedonic value of a human life is difficult to measure did not
make either Smith's testimony or the damages speculative. Damages are speculative
when the probability that a circumstance as an element of compepsation is conjec-
tural. The rule against recovery of 'speculative damages' is generally directed
against uncertainty as to cause rather than uncertainty as to measure or extent.
That is, if it is uncertain whether the defendant caused the damages, or whether
the damages proved flowed from his act, there may be no recovery of such uncer-
tain damages; whereas, uncertainty which affects merely the measure or extent of
the injuries suffered does not bar a recovery.
26. Id at 162.
7
Price: Hedonic Damages: To Value a Life or Not to Value a Life
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1055
on the "willingness-to-pay" approach? Under the "willingness-to-pay"
method of evaluation, only a probable range of the value of lost enjoy-
ment of life can be given. "The life-value estimates range from just
under $100,000 to upward of $2 billion. That is a very, very broad
range .... An economist can present a probable range for the value
of life, but only the jury can decide where on that range any given
individual fails. ' 2 As Professor Smith admits, only the jury can make
the final determination of the award.29 This, of course, begs the ques-
tion of whether hedonic damages are too speculative to be admissible
in court.
Other attacks on the "willingness-to-pay" model have concluded
that the underlying premise of paying for safety as a way of measur-
ing the enjoyment of life is flawed. Jerome Staller, Ph.D, suggests that
the "willingness-to-pay" model is based on guidelines for public safety
27. Stanley V. Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 74 A.B.A.J., Sep-
tember 1, 1988, at 70. For a comprehensive and detailed review of the willingness-to-pay
model, see Michael L. Brookshire & Stanley V. Smith, Economic/Hedonic Damages: The
Practice Book for Plaintiff and Defense Attorneys (1990) and Gary A. Magnarini & Stan V.
Smith, Hedonic Damages, Wis. LAW., Feb. 1991, at 17. Basically, the "willingness-to-pay"
model, values life by measuring the amount of money an individual, business or government
agency would pay in order to avoid or reduce the risk of injury or death to one or more
persons.
Four factors comprise the willingness-to-pay model:
(1) Studies based on data regarding what private citizens spend on their own safe-
ty, e.g., how much people pay for air bags, smoke detectors;
(2) Questionnaire studies in which economists have determined how much extra
money people would pay to remain safe; e.g., how much more would a person
pay for a safer airline;
(3) Labor market studies in which economists measure how much extra a worker
must be paid to work a job which has a higher measurable life risk; e.g., coal
miner, window washer, and
(4) Studies of government regulations which require certain amount of money to
be spent on the prevention of loss of life through regulation.
Brookshire & Smith, supra note 2, at 167-68. For a summary of the willingness-to-pay
model and other lesser known models which attempt to categorize the hedonic value of life,
see Erin A. O'Hara, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death: Are Tortfeasors Getting Away
with Murder?, 78 GEo. L.J. 1687 (1990).
28. Smith, supra note 27, at 73.
29. It is interesting to note that according to Professor Smith, the value of an ordi-
nary life of a median-aged person in 1989 dollars equals about $60,000 a year. Brookshire
& Smith, supra note 27, at 172.
1062
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and not the value of an individual's loss of enjoyment of life. Dr.
Staller proposes that a more precise method of valuing hedonic damag-
es would be a "time method evaluation." ° Yet, Dr. Staller also ad-
mits that the valuation of hedonic damages "is at best a subjective
exercise based on vague, if not outright inappropriate, economic theo-
ries."31 As other commentators have noted, there is not a recognized
method for measuring hedonic loss.32 Although there is no single
measure to precisely ascertain the value of loss of enjoyment of life,
cases which offer expert testimony quantifying hedonic damages are
becoming more prevalent.3
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF HEDONIC DAMAGES
The admissibility of proposed hedonic damages evidence depends
on the case in which it is introduced. The presentation of hedonic
damages will face various objections which are based primarily on
whether the proposed testimony is introduced in a personal injury case
or in a wrongful death action; the basic and elementary difference
being that a personal injury action is not governed by statute as is a
wrongful death action. Since a wrongful death action is based on stat-
ute, objections to hedonic damages begin with the construction of the
wrongful death statute and its statutory interpretation, while objections
30. Jerome M. Staller, Placing a Value on the Enjoyment of Life, 31 FoR THE DEF.,
June 1989, at 8-10.
31. IA at 9. In their book, Professors Brookshire and Smith go to considerable lengths
to explain their calculations and defend their methodology against their critics. Brookshire &
Smith, supra note 27, at 57-64 (Supp. 1992).
32. For a detailed examination of the measurements of hedonic damages and various
methods of calculation including the human capital approach, the willingness-to-pay model,
the lost pleasure of life scale and the per-hour method of measurement, see Valentine, supra
note 4, at 547-55; Tina M. Tabacchi, Hedonic Damages: A New Trend in Compensation?,
52 OHIo ST. L.J. 331, 336-42 (1991), and for a detailed economic analysis, see James
Lambrinos, Hedonic Damages: Economic Theory, Statistical Foundation, Strategy, 58 DEF.
COUNS. J. 391 (1991).
33. Professors Brookshire & Smith note that their expert testimony has been allowed
or presented in the state courts of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and in the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Brookshire & Smith, supra note 27, at 102 (Supp.
1992).
106319931
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to hedonic damages in personal injury actions vary upon the evidentia-
ry ground.
In case law throughout the country, objections to the proposed
admissibility of expert testimony on hedonic damages have addressed
issues such as the expert testimony on this subject being too specula-
tive, excessive, and inconsistent verdicts are awarded when hedonic
damages are introduced, the testimony invades the jury's domain, im-
permissible per diem arguments,M and simply that hedonic damages
cannot make the victim whole. Arguments for hedonic damages focus
on the methodology, the fact that people and governments do value
life in certain enumerated ways, and that placing a monetary value on
life limits a possible excessive or inconsistent verdict, which in turn
adds consistency to a litigious society.
Some courts are still entertaining objections that a hedonic damage
award may be duplicative of a pain and suffering award or are includ-
ed within the total damage award. However, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has held that a hedonic damage award is not
a duplication of the elements of pain and suffering, nor is it a part of
pain and suffering, but is its own element of permanent injury.3 s Un-
der present law then, such an objection should be overruled by the
trial and this Article, therefore, will not elaborate on this point.
A. Personal Injury Claims
In a personal injury action, loss of enjoyment of life damages can
be awarded to an injured party "by ascertaining how the injury has
deprived the plaintiff of his customary activities as a whole person., 36
34. "Per Diem" literally means "by the day." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1136 (6th
ed. 1990). A per diem argument is an argument to the jury which places a specific dollar
figure upon each minute, hour or day on an element of damages for the jury to make an
award. For example, an argument asking the jury to award the plaintiff one dollar for each
hour of pain the plaintiff will suffer for the next twenty years would be an impermissible
per diem argument. See Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18, syl. pt. 5 (W. Va. 1961); Illosky v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 616 (W. Va. 1983); Hewett v. Frye, 401 S.E.2d 222,
226 (W. Va. 1990).
35. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435-39.
36. L at 436.
1064 [Vol. 95:1055
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As noted earlier, the claim for loss of enjoyment of life damages, or
hedonic damages, is based on the goal of the tort system to compen-
sate an individual for all injuries suffered. For the most part, tort dam-
ages are based on the harm incurred by the individual without any
limitation by statute.37
The majority of jurisdictions are now following the leadership of
the Flannery court in holding that hedonic damages are a separate
element of damages and thus can be awarded in a personal injury
action.38 Since hedonic damage testimony may be introduced as a
part of a damage award in a personal injury action, there are basically
two ways to present such testimony. First is the traditional method in
which the lawyer puts the plaintiff on the stand to testify to his per-
sonal injury and his loss of enjoyment of life. Additionally, the
plaintiff's family and friends can be called to substantiate and add to
such testimony.39 As an example:
37. Yet, West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8 does provide a limitation or cap on liability
of one million dollars for non-economic loss in a medical professional liability action
brought against a health care provider. West Virginia Code § 55-7B-2(g) defines "non-eco-
nomic loss" as "losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish and
grief." The Flannery court held that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are found in the
second category of damages, that is "intangible damages since they are 'unliquidated' in the
sense that there is no precise monetary calculation that can be used to determine the
amount of the loss." Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435.
The particular importance of this statute is that an argument can be made, and has
been made, that if expert testimony is allowed by the court to be introduced quantifying
hedonic damages as a fixed monetary figure, hedonic damages could be categorized within
"those damages which are termed 'liquidated' or 'pecuniary' in the sense that they represent
some form of expense or economic loss that can be rendered reasonably certain monetarily
by a mathematical figure or calculation." let; see Magnarini & Smith, supra note 27, at 56
n.5. Hedonic damages, classified as a reasonably certain monetary figure, may be character-
ized not as a "non-economic loss," but as an economic loss which, would then presumably
take the hedonic damage testimony outside of the one million dollar liability cap set by
West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8.
38. For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed that hedonic damages are non-eco-
nomic, unliquidated damages in that the Flannery court began its discussions of loss of
enjoyment of life damages by noting that it is comprised within "the second category ...
of intangible damages." Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435-39.
39. See William . Gillen & Bruce A. Olson, Economic and Legal Defenses Against
Claims for Hedonic Damages, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 1991, at 18, 19. The traditional method
to offer proof of the loss of enjoyment of life has been through testimony, such as:
-Physician comments on any physical limitations the injured plaintiff may suffer,
19931 1065
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[J]uries have been permitted to consider the reduction in that person's
ability to enjoy both sensory perception as well as physical activities due
to the individual's injury. "Examples of provable elements are: inability to
dance, bowl, swim or engage in similar recreational activities; inability to
perform customary household chores; and, inability to engage in the usual
family activities."'
Of course, presenting hedonic damage testimony in this manner re-
quires that counsel know their client, including all physical activities
normally undertaken at home, at work, and in other significant ares of
the client's lifestyle. Counsel must satisfactorily elicit this testimony at
trial and persuasively argue hedonic damages to the jury in closing
argument.4
1
The second and'most controversial manner in which hedonic dam-
age testimony is elicited is through expert testimony. The idea of
expert testimony quantifying hedonic damages is a relatively new con-
cept. Since Sherrod v. Berry, the majority of reported cases in which
expert testimony has been attempted to be introduced has been in the
area of wrongful death actions and not in personal injury suits.4 1
-Psychologists or psychiatrists to testify to any psychic trauma or lasting psychic
effect afflicting the plaintiff;
-Family members testifying to personal observations on specific hedonic aspects;
and
-Friends, clergy, coworkers, and similar witnesses giving their own observations
of the plaintiffs diminished enjoyment of life.
Id "The traditional proof focuses on the specific individual who has been harmed, and on
testimony concerning the personal impact of the loss of the given individual." Id
40. Tabacchi, supra note 32, at 334-35.
41. Of course, counsel. must make sure that they only make permissible arguments.
For a more detailed discussion of permissible arguments, see Professor Cleckley's article on
arguing damages in West Virginia in an upcoming issue of the West Virginia Law Review.
Also, for two recent articles discussing arguments for intangible damages, see William S.
Bailey et al., Communicating About Pain, TRIAL, June 1992, at 110; Larry S. Stewart, Ar-
guing Pain and Suffering Damages in Summation, TRIAL, Mar. 1992, at 55.
42. Although no reason can be found for this fact, the rationale may lie in the rea-
soning that in a personal injury action the plaintiff can testify and express his own loss,
without the need of an economist to tell the jury the loss.suffered by the plaintiff. In a
wrongful death action, the recovery is statutory, and an economist is in a better position to
quantify the loss of enjoyment of life than the decedent.
1066 [Vol. 95:1055
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Although the West Virginia Supreme Court has yet to address the
propriety of expert testimony quantifying hedonic damages, there are
various evidentiary standards and objections to be confronted before
such testimony should be admitted.
1. Opinion Evidence
The first objection to expert testimony quantifying hedonic damag-
es is the standard for admissibility of expert testimony under Rule of
Evidence 702. This rule holds that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testi-
fy thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."4 3 Traditionally for
expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, the expert opinion
must concern subject matter which is sufficiently complex as to be
beyond the comprehension of the ordinary lay person, yet, not so
complex, novel or speculative as to be outside the scope of general
acceptance or have an unreliable scientific basis.
In West Virginia, the proposed admissibility of expert testimony
on hedonic damages ultimately rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and a trial court's ruling will not ordinarily be disturbed
unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused." Histori-
cally, the West Virginia courts have liberally interpreted Rule 702 in
favor of allowing an expert to testify if the expert has the proper
qualifications, and his testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact.4
In fact, West Virginia has allowed the admissibility of expert testimo-
ny on a variety of scientific topics novel in their day, based on the
simple holding that "the key test is whether the witness has specialized
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact."
4 6
43. V. VA. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
44. Jones v. Games, 395 S.E.2d 548, 550 (W. Va. 1990).
45. FRANKuN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS,
§ 7.1 B(3) at 421-22 (2d ed. 1986).
46. Ventura v. Winegardner, 357 S.E.2d 764, 768 (W. Va. 1987). For cases in which
novel theories were allowed to be presented, see State v. Dietz, 390 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va.
1990) (expert testimony admitted concerning psychosexual murder); State v. Woodall, 385
19931 1067
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When reviewing the proposed admissibility of hedonic damages,
two questions must be answered. First, whether the expert has the
proper qualifications. In Ventura v. Winegardner,47 the West Virginia
Supreme Court reviewed the qualifications of four expert witnesses
who testified at trial concerning the injuries suffered by a college
tennis player after she fell and injured her knee. The court noted that
"Ventura's experts ran from the top to the bottom of the scale, superb-
ly qualified; qualified, and unqualified." With regard to the qualified
experts, the court held the testimony was properly admitted based on
each expert's experience, education, and the liberality of Rule 702.49
The court then reviewed the last expert witness called, Mr. Thomas
Serpento.50 lvr. Serpento was called to testify to the plaintiff's future
earnings as a tennis professional. His background was in vocational
and guidance counseling and he was employed by West Virginia Uni-
versity as Director of Human Resources.5 1 At trial, Mr. Serpento ad-
mitted he knew very little about tennis, had no training or experience
as to the salaries of tennis professionals and arrived at his calculated
opinion of the future earnings based on an article in an issue of Tennis
Week Magazine.2
The court held that Mr. Serpento was not qualified to give an
opinion. He had no training in the field of professional sports and no
S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989) (DNA typing evidence held reliable and therefore expert testimo-
ny admissible); Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988) (expert testimony al-
lowed concerning possibility of benefit of novel electronic prosthetic leg); State v.
Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988) (bite mark evidence admitted); State v. McCoy,
366 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988) (expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome admitted); State
v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642 (W. Va. 1988) (expert testimony on the Horizontal Gaze Nystag-
mus test admitted); State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558 (W. Va. 1987) (battered women's syn-
drome expert testimony admitted); State v. Wallace, 337 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1985) (expert
testimony admitted on hair analysis); State v. Wyant, 328 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1985) (expert
testimony admitted on the leuco-malachite green test, which detects for the presence of
blood); State v. Johnson, 164 S.E. 31 (V. Va. 1932) (fingerprint evidence expert testimony
admitted).
47. 357 S.E.2d 764 (W. Va. 1987).
48. 1d1 at 768.
49. L
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
1068 [Vol. 95:1055
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expertise in the salary of tennis players.53 Also, he admittedly had
little knowledge of the productive life of a tennis player, had reduced
his economic figure to present value without showing the appropriate
calculations, and had based his opinion on an issue of Tennis Week
Magazine, a publication not shown to be a reliable basis for expert
opinion.54 The court held that experts may base their opinions on
treatises and publications in their profession, but must first show the
authoritative nature of the work.5 The scope of the Ventura ruling
shows that the West Virginia court is liberal in admitting expert testi-
mony, but it does have limits in admitting such evidence. In all cases,
expert opinion must be based on proof that it is rendered with the
proper qualifications, reliability, and authority.
In Cargill v. Balloon Works, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia reviewed a circuit court decision to exclude the
plaintiffs expert as to a defective design in the manufacture of a hot
air balloon which crashed and caused the death of its occupants. The
court reviewed the liberal rules of evidence and held that the proposed
expert had experience in repairs of balloons and was qualified by his
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education as an expert.57 The
court then noted that although Rule of Evidence 702 enunciates a
standard, "[i]t cannot encompass every nuance of a specific factual
matter or a particular individual sought to be qualified."58 Rule 702
cannot be interpreted to require that experience, education, or training
be in complete congruence with the nature of the issues sought to be
proven.59 "It is within the province of the jury to evaluate the testi-
mony, credentials, background, and qualifications of the witness to ad-
dress the particular issue in question. The jury may then assign the
testimony such weight and value as the jury may determine."'
53. I& at 768-69.
54. l at 769.
55. Id.
56. 405 S.E.2d 642 (W. Va. 1991).
57. I& at 646.
58. Id
59. Id at 646-47.
60. Id. The court also held that "once introduction of an expert's testimony is per-
mitted, the opposing party may exercise its right of cross-examination in which questions
regarding the expert's credentials, training, experience, and qualifications may be raised and
106919931
15
Price: Hedonic Damages: To Value a Life or Not to Value a Life
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
When introducing an expert to testify on hedonic damages, coun-
sel must present an individual who has training in economics and
hedonic damages and possesses a thorough understanding of the eco-
nomic model for determining the hedonic estimate. In almost all cases,
an expert who can calculate and testify as to a hedonic value of life
based on an appropriate economic model has the necessary educational
qualifications to be admitted as an expert under Rule 702.
Yet, the corollary or second objection to the expert's qualifications
under Rule 702 remains. The second question as to admissibility focus-
es on the authority of the expert's scientific basis. Specifically, wheth-
er the facts and basis of the expert's opinions are reliable, valid, or
generally accepted in the scientific community.
With regard to admitting opinions based on novel scientific theo-
ries, the West Virginia Supreme Court, in State v. Armstrong,61 ap-
proved a more lenient standard of admissibility to judge novel scien-
tific theories. For many years, the admissibility of new expert theories
was governed by the well-known Frye62 test which allowed for the
introduction of expert testimony which had gained general acceptance
in its particular scientific field.63 In Armstrong, the court adopted the
standard which is being followed by an increasing number of courts,
as set forth in United States v. Downing.64
In Downing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered the admission of expert testimony in the field of
human perception and memory and the reliability of eyewitness iden-
tification in a criminal case.65 The Third Circuit rejected the Frye test,
in favor of a three-point test to review the admission of novel scien-
tific evidence under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Downing court held that the soundness and reliability of a novel theory
should be the basis for the evidentiary standard and the critical ele-
ment to judge admissibility.66 Additionally, a direct connection be-
any perceived weaknesses may be revealed." Id.
61. 369 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1988).
62. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
63. Id. at 1014.
64. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
65. Idt at 1226.
66. ld at 1237-38. Specifically, the Downing court held that when reviewing the
[Vol. 95:10551070
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tween the test and factual disputes in the case must be established and
consideration must be given to the possible confusion of the jury.67
The Downing court concluded, "[E]ven if the proffered evidence satis-
fies Rule 702, the district court may decide nonetheless to invoke Rule
403 to exclude the evidence if the court finds its probative value to be
substantially outweighed by other dangers, e.g., confusion of the issues
or waste of time."6
The West Virginia court in Armstrong considered the Downing
case and noted that "a scientific expert's testimony is admissible if
shown to involve relevant scientific tests which assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence, even if such tests and the underlying sci-
entific principle(s) are not yet generally accepted in the particular
scientific field.,
69
The Downing standard sets forth a sound test to guide the trial
court to determine the admissibility of expert testimony on hedonic
damages. First, plaintiff's counsel must establish that the expert to
testify to hedonic damages has the proper qualifications. Second, the
testimony on hedonic damages must be shown to be reliable, valid,
and helpful to the jury and the proponent of the evidence must prove
to the court that the methodology to determine hedonic loss is solid.
Defense counsel can challenge the theories and bases of hedonic dam-
age expert testimony by closely looking at the studies and principles
upon which the expert bases his range of values for hedonic damages.
The last evidentiary objection defense counsel has is the standard
Rule 40370 objection that even if probative, the testimony is substan-
admissibility of a proposed theory, the court should:
conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and reliability of the
process or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admit-
ting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the
proffered connection between the scientific research or test result to be presented,
and the particular disputed factual issues in the'case.
Id at 1237.
67. IAt at 1238.
68. Id at 1242-43.
69. State v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 874-75 n.4 (W. Va. 1988)
70. W. VA. R. EVID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
19931 ,1071
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tially more prejudicial or misleading or would confuse the jury." But,
considering the liberality of Rule 702, the scientific principles pro-
pounded, and the seeming authority of the hedonic experts being pre-
sented at trial, a trial court would have to closely scrutinize each ex-
pert and the authority before excluding such testimony upon this evi-
dentiary ground. Yet, regardless of the expertise of the hedonic expert,
the hurdle of Rule 403, combined with other objections, remains a
significant impediment to the admissibility of expert opinion on hedon-
ic damages.
2. Per Diem Argument
A second objection which may be put forth against hedonic dam-
ages in personal injury actions is that an economist testifying to specif-
ic monetary figures for loss of enjoyment of life damages would repre-
sent an impermissible per diem argument to the jury. In Crum v.
Ward,72 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled that
plaintiff's counsel was barred during closing argument from attempting
to place a monetary value on pain and suffering. 3 In Crum, during
closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff was permitted to write on a
blackboard and present to the jury figures relative to the plaintiff's
claim for pain and suffering which was calculated on a daily basis and
a specific dollar figure.74 Defense counsel objected that this was a
"per diem" argument for determining the value of pain and suffer-
the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
71. See State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 259-60 (W. Va. 1989). In fact, Professor
Cleckley believes that when an expert makes an evaluation of a commonplace subject (as
the value of life may be argued to be), and the expert witness supplants a jury's indepen-
dent exercise of common sense, a necessary independent inquiry must be conducted under
Rule 403 to exclude prejudicial evidence. CLECKLEY, supra note 45, § 7,1(B)(1) at 95
(Supp. 1989).
72. 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961).
73. The Cram case was cited extensively by United States District Judge Copenhaver
in a recent case from the Southern District of West Virginia in Walker v. Brady, infra note
78, in which Judge Copenhaver denied the plaintiffs from introducing Dr. Brookshire's testi-
mony on hedonic damages.
74. Crum, 122 S.E.2d at 22-23.
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ing.75 The Crum court looked to other state court opinions and held
that "[t]here is no measure by which the amount of pain and suffering
endured by a particular human can be calculated, and no standard of
value which can be applied."76 Additionally, "[t]o permit plaintiff's
counsel to suggest and argue to the jury an amount to be allowed for
pain, suffering, mental anguish and disability calculated on a daily or
other fixed basis, allows him to invade the province of the jury and to
get before it what does not appear in the evidence." The court then
reviewed the diverse positions with regard to the range of permissible
and impermissible closing arguments and held that "the amount of
damages allowable for pain and suffering is peculiarly a jury question,
and that no known method of arriving at any money value thereof
exists, or could exist. No testimony as to any money value of pain and
suffering is admissible in evidence, no matter how experienced or
learned the witness. 78 In that hedonic damages are classified as in-
tangible damages, like pain and suffering, overcoming an objection that
hedonic damage testimony may be a per diem argument appears to be
a daunting task.
In a recent federal case, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia considered the question of proposed
expert testimony on the issue of hedonic damages in Walker v.
Brady.79 The court considered the admissibility of the testimony of
Michael Brookshire, Ph.D., on the issue of hedonic damages.30 After
reviewing the proposed expert testimony on hedonic damages, the court
excluded Dr. Brookshire's testimony on the grounds that hedonic dam-
ages are intangible damages, and in that they are intangible, "just as
no two people have the same sensitivity to pain, no two people have
an identical appreciation for the" joys of life," held that the expert
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 23 (citing Botta v. Bmunner, 138 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1958)).
77. Id. at 24 (citing Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 109 S.E.2d 126
(Va. 1959)).
78. Id. at 25.
79. No. 2-91-0324 (S.D. W. Va. June 17, 1992) (interim order).
80. Id. at 1.
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testimony on hedonic damages is speculative, and therefore inadmissi-
ble.81
In Walker, the court pointed out that the Crum court cited an
earlier West Virginia case, Yuncke v. Welker, 2 which held that "[i]n
an action for personal injuries, the damages are unliquidated and inde-
terminate in character, and the assessment of such damages is the
peculiar and exclusive province of the jury." 3 The Crum court also
held that "[i]n our view, the mathematical formula argument is based
wholly on speculation, or imaginary inferences, not supported by facts,
in reality by supposed facts which could not be received in evidence if
offered. No effort, perhaps, would succeed in pointing out the almost
innumerable variables necessarily existing or involved in such specula-
tion."s' Judge Copenhaver concluded the Walker opinion by holding
that hedonic damage testimony by an expert is speculative and is not
an element of damages which should be quantified by an economist,
but should be left for the sound and collective minds of the average
jury to ponder and calculate.
This sentiment was likewise held by an Illinois appellate court
which suggested that an argument on hedonic damages would reach
the parameters of a per diem argument. In Fetzer v. Wood,8  the Illi-
nois Appellate Court for the Second District held:
[I]t is well settled that, with respect to damages for pain and suffering,
i.e., nonpecuniary damages, it is improper for counsel to suggest that the
jury calculate such damages by placing a dollar figure upon each minute,
81. kd at 17-19.
82. 36 S.E.2d 410 (W. Va. 1945).
83. Id at 411, syl. pt. 3.
84. Crum, 122 S.E.2d at 26. The Crum court also added an illustration:
[t may be suggested that any attempt to place a money value on pain for any
definite unit of time is impossible of any sound basis, for no two persons, it is
believed, bear the same sensitivity to pain. The severity or duration of pain,
though resulting from the same cause, varies as to different individuals so greatly
that the most experienced and learned physician find no method of measuring it,
but, to a very large extent, must rely on representations of the patient.
Id
85. 569 N.E.2d 1237 (1I1. App. Ct. 1991).
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hour or day as to which pain and suffering was or will be experienced,
since such argument presents an illusion of certainty.6
On the one hand, a strong argument can be made that hedonic
damages, by calculating the worth of a person's life would be placing
an impermissible price tag on the "enjoyment of life" and thus present-
ing an impermissible per diem argument The counter argument is that
the methodology behind hedonic damages looks to the value of the
total worth of life, not to the specific value of a certain injury, and
thus is not calculating a "per diem" argument.
3. Province of the Jury and Speculation
In Flannery, the court held that loss of enjoyment of life damages
are in the category of intangible damages since there is no precise
monetary calculation to determine the amount of the loss 87
Here, however, we have an element, a component, of damages that may be
considered by a jury in determining the amount of its award. Just as a
jury may consider the nature, effect and severity of pain when fixing dam-
ages for personal injury, or may consider mental anguish caused by scars
and disfigurement, it may consider loss of enjoyment of life.'
The Flannery court implicitly stated, if not explicitly, that hedonic
damages are solely in the jury's deliberative wisdom. The Flannery
court cited Warth v. Jackson County Court,9 for the proposition that
when the plaintiff is allowed a recovery for pain, mental anguish, and
impairment of capacity to enjoy life, just compensation for the
plaintiff's injury is a matter for the reasonable judgment of the jury,
and there is no rule by which to approximate these kinds of damages
with anything like mathematical accuracy.' ° The Flannery court also
favorably cited Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores,91 which held that:
86. Id. at 1246.
87. Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 435.
88. I& at 438.
89. 76 S.E. 420 (W. Va. 1912).
90. 1d at 423.
91. 154 S.E. 769 (W. Va. 1930).
1993] 1075
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It would be very difficult, if not quite impossible, to lay down a yardstick,
or measure, by which to compensate for pain and suffering, or the impair-
ment of health... where the damages do not admit of definite or approx-
imate estimate, there is no legal measure of damages, and the law leaves
the amount entirely to the sound discretion of the jury...
This opinion is consistent with the law of damages in West Vir-
ginia. In one of the recent cases on this subject, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reiterated the rule that general or intangible
damages are solely within the jury's domain and discretion:
An award for mental anguish is necessarily based upon a subjective evalu-
ation by the jury of the injured individual and the evidence he presents.
Likewise, an award for pain and suffering is necessarily based upon simi-
lar intangible and subjective evaluations. Thus, no mathematical calculation
can be employed to determine an award for mental anguish or pain and
suffering .... Such awards must remain within the discretion of the
jury .... 93
The objection to hedonic damages based on the reasoning that it
invades the providence or domain of the jury and is speculative is
possibly the most persuasive one against expert testimony on hedonic
damages, and it is the toughest point for plaintiff's counsel to over-
come. It is a unique fact in our court system that it is for the collec-
tive minds of the jury to determine the verdict on its own.94 Many
West Virginia cases have held that in assessing damages for personal
injuries based in part on pain and suffering, testimony which attempts
to place a money value on pain and suffering is inadmissible. 5 As
Flannery held, hedonic damages are an intangible element of damages
92. id. at 773-74.
93. Hewett v. Frye, 401 S.E.2d 222, 225 (W. Va. 1990).
94. "Equally certain is that '[t]he law recognizes that the aggregate judgment of
twelve duly selected and properly qualified jurors represents the best method yet devised for
fixing the amount of just compensation to the injured plaintiffs in such cases [involving
pain and suffering, mental anguish or other indeterminate damages].'" Roberts v. Stevens
Clinic Hospital, Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791, 806 (W. Va. 1986) (McHugh ., dissenting) (citing
Sargent v. Malcomb, 146 S.E.2d 561, 566 (W. Va. 1966)).
95. Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d at 18, syl. pt. 4; see supra text accompanying note
1076 [Vol. 95:1055
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which are in the same category as pain and suffering. "The job of
determining such intangible and subjective damages as personal humili-
ation, mental anguish, and indignity has always been the exclusive
province of the jury ....
Recent West Virginia cases have continued to hold that expert
testimony should be excluded if the opinion is an "invasion of the
province of the jury" or reaches the "ultimate issue" of the case.' In
State v. Mitter,98 the court held that when the subject matter of expert
testimony is within the common knowledge of the jury, expert opinion
is ordinarily not admissible." Additionally, "[e]xpert opinion evidence
concerning a matter as to which the jury are as competent to form an
accurate opinion as the witness, is inadmissible."" °
One hundred years ago in Overby v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co., °1 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held inadmis-
sible the testimony of a witness whose answers were within the com-
mon knowledge of the jury. "When the inquiry relates to a subject
which does not require peculiar habits of study in order to enable a
man to understand it, the opinion of skilled witnesses is not admissible.""°
96. Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 693 (W. Va. 1975).
97. CLECKLEY, supra note 45, § 7.1 (3)(3) at 422.
98. 285 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1981).
99. 1& at 378.
100. Id. at 378 (citing Lawrence's Adm'r v. Hyde, 88 S.E. 45, syl. pt. 7 (W. Va.
1916)); see also McCroskey v. Proctor, 332 S.E.2d 646, 650 (W. Va. 1985). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held similarly. Persinger v. Norfolk &
Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1188 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Although expert testimony is gen-
erally presumed helpful to the jury, we have held that Rule ,702 excludes expert testimony
on matters within the common knowledge of jurors . . . . Other courts have interpreted
Rule 702 similarly.").
101. 16 S.E. 813 (W. Va. 1893).
102. lt at 817. The court also cited from Rogers on Expert Testimony, holding:
If the facts can be placed before a jury, and they are of such a nature that jurors
generally are just as competent to form opinions in reference to them and draw
inferences from them as witnesses, then the opinions of experts cannot be received
in evidence . . . .The opinion of a witness who neither knows or can know more
about the subject-matter than the jury, and who must draw his deductions from
facts already in the possession of the jury, it not admissible.
Id.; see also Thrasher v. Amere Gas Utilities Company, 75 S.E.2d 376, 385 (W. Va. 1953):
"Ordinarily it is not proper for a witness to express an opinion concerning a matter as to
which the jury is as well qualified to form an opinion as is the witness."
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In a recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, a wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim was made in El-Meswari v. Washington Gas Light
Co."13 The plaintiff tried to introduce expert testimony as to the
mother's emotional response to the death of her child."
The district court, condluding that the jury could assess the mother's inner
grief without expert guidance, excluded Dr. Ommaya's testimony on that
point. This decision represented a reasonable exercise of the trial judge's
broad discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to determine that a
proposed expert will not significantly assist the arbiter of fact."°
As has been held for many years, expert testimony which invades
the jury's domain is inadmissible. To counter this point, the plaintiff's
most persuasive argument for the introduction of expert testimony re-
garding hedonic damages is that such testimony helps act as a guide to
aid the jury in making an award allowing consistency in verdicts
where no parameters to guide the jury exist. "The testimony can give
a jury a concrete basis for discussing and deciding upon an award. In
a case where the injury is not physically obvious, such testimony can
help a jury recognize the seriousness of the hidden loss."' 06 Addi-
tionally, with the recent arguments for tort reform becoming more
pervasive, and in light of the perceived explosion of "excessive" ver-
dicts, expert testimony on hedonic damages adds an element of fair-
ness, equality, and consistency to jury awards in that the hedonic value
of life is systematically determined. "Such testimony can reduce the
wide variation of such awards and assist juries in arriving at more fair
and consistent verdicts." 7 Although various reports, statistics, and
103. 785 F.2d 483 ,(4th Cir. 1986).
104. Id at 487.
105. Id; see also Lopez v. City Towing Assocs., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988), wherein the trial court was affirmed after "excluding the testimony of an economist
regarding the value of lost guidance, counselling, love, affection, companionship and society
suffered by the plaintiffs." Id at 259. The appellate court held this testimony was properly
excluded because "the jury is equally competent to form an opinion regarding the ultimate
fact issues, . . . [b]ased upon ... the jury's own experiences, we believe they were capa-
ble of placing a dollar figure on plaintiff's damage elements." Id at 260.
106. Brookshire & Smith, supra note 27, at 161-62.
107. Id at 97, 104 (Supp. 1992). "We recommend that the concern that such testimony
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studies may support a hedonic economist's testimony, before a hedonic
expert is allowed to testify, there still remains the basic question of
whether hedonic damages should be left to the jurors' collective wis-
dom.103
4. Other Decisions
After considering all of these issues, there have only been a few
reported, cases which have addressed hedonic damages evidence pre-
sented by expert testimony in personal injury actions. The first case
which barred expert testimony in a personal injury action was Mercado
v. Ahmed."° The Mercado opinion represents a scholarly and insight-
ful opinion regarding an economist's testimony as to hedonic damages
and the theories and principles underlying the experts' opinions. °
In Mercado, the plaintiff's son was hit by a taxi and claimed
medical injuries and loss of enjoyment of life damages."' The jury
awarded the plaintiff $79,000 in damages. The plaintiff appealed on
the ground that the district judge improperly disallowed Professor Stan-
ley Smith' from testifying that the plaintiff's son's "lost pleasure of
leads to unreasonably high verdicts be addressed by adopting conservative approaches to life
valuation, consistent with our recommendation of a conservative approach in all damages
estimation." Id. at 104.
108. In Roberts, Justice McHugh and Justice McGraw strongly dissented when the
majority substituted their opinion for the collective opinion of the jury and ordered a remit-
titur of the verdict. Justice McHugh, citing an Arizona case, held: "No two persons are
alike. No two injuries are alike. No two juries are alike. Unlike workers' compensation,
awards for pain and suffering in personal injury actions or for solatium in wrongful death
actions should not be based on pre-determined schedules. The worth and dignity of the
individual is a milestone of our society." 345 S.E.2d at 810 n.13 (citing Wry v. Dial, 503
P.2d 979, 990-91 (Ariz. CL App. 1972)).
109. 756 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aft'd, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992).
110. The memorandum opinion by District Judge Zagel in Mercado has been the only
opinion which specifically addressed the reliability and validity of an expert opinion on
hedonic damages. District Judge Zagel recognized that although new scientific theories or
principles arise, although they may be valid theories, their reliability has yet to be tested.
Id at 1098. District Judge Zagel held that to date, as to hedonic damages, "[t]here is a
lack of reliability," and overall, the evidence may fail to assist the trier of fact. Id. at 1103.
111. Mercado, 974 F.2d at 865.
112. Prof. Smith is the same expert who testified in the seminal case on expert opinion
on hedonic damages, Sharrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. IMI. 1985); see supra notes
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living due to the injuries he suffered in the taxi accident was
$2,207,827 to $2,762,227.-113
The district court in Mercado held that there was no basic agree-
ment among economists as to what data or elements go into the evalu-
ation of hedonic damages.
What is wrong here is not that the evidence is founded on consensus or
agreement, it is that the consensus is that of persons who are no more ex-
pert than are the jurors on the value of the lost pleasures of life. Even if
reliable and valid, the evidence may fail to 'assist the trier of fact to un-
derstand the evidence or determine a fact in issue' in a -way more mean-
ingful than would occur if the jury asked a group of wise courtroom by-
standers for their opinions."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recent-
ly affirmed the district court's opinion in Mercado, finding that the
jury verdict was not inconsistent with the evidence at trial. Specifi-
cally, when the court of appeals addressed the hedonic damage expert
testimony, the court asked, "[D]oes Stanley Smith, supported by his
- extensive willingness-to-pay research, know better than the average ju-
ror how much life is worth?" 5 When reviewing Professor Smith's
method of evaluating life, the court held that the testimony was prop-
erly excluded. "This conclusion may be less a reflection of the flaws
in Smith's methodology than on the impossibility of any person
achieving unique knowledge of the value of life."' 16 As the court of
2-25 and accompanying text.
113. Id at 869.
114. Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1103; see also Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1247
(1l. App. Ct. 1991) (holding Professor Smith's testimony inadmissible because the "present
expert economic testimony on damages which, by their very nature, are not amenable to
such analytical precision" and "the proposed economic expert testimony would be overly
speculative and would serve to invade the province of the jury"); Southlake Limousine, Inc.
v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that expert testimony "is not
permissible unless the subject is difficult of comprehension or evaluation").
115. Mercado, 974 F.2d at 870.
116. Id at 871. The Seventh Circuit also looked to Stanley Smith's premise of valuing
life and stated "we have serious doubts about his assertion that the studies he relies upon
actually measure how much Americans value life." Id The Seventh Circuit noted that
Smith's studies may not truly reflect the value of life.
[Vol. 95:10551080
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appeals alluded to in Mercado, when confronted with a personal injury
action, professing an economic standard for the value of life is a
daunting task11
7
Since hedonic damages by use and definition are general and
unliquidated, and there is no definite measure of damages for unliqui-
dated damages such as pain and suffering, the amount of compensation
therefore seemingly should be left to the sound discretion of the ju-
ry."' In summary, there are solid arguments that can be made for
and against hedonic damages in a personal injury case. Although a
court may find the expert testimony helpful to a jury and may aid in
For example, spending on items like air bags and smoke detectors is probably
influenced as much by advertising and marketing decision made by profit-seeking
manufacturers and by government-mandated safety requirements as it is by any
consideration by consumers of how much life is worth. Also, many people may be
interested in a whole range of safety devices and believe they are worthwhile, but
are unable to afford them. More fundamentally, spending on safety items reflects a
consumer's willingness to pay to reduce risk, perhaps more a measure of how
cautious a person is than how much he or she values life. Few of us, when con-
fronted with the threat, 'Your money or your life!' would, like Jack Benny, pause
and respond, 'I'm thinking, I'm thinking.' Most of us would empty our wallets.
Why that decision reflects less the value we place on life than whether we buy an
air bag is not immediately obvious.
Id. at 871. The court then concluded that "Smith was no more expert in valuing life than
the average person." Id.
117. Id. In Craft v. Matlack, Inc., No. CIV.A.91-2465, 1992 WL 124406 (E.D. La.
May 26, 1992), the court barred the plaintiff's economist, Melville Z. Wolfson, from testify-
ing, holding that hedonic damages are "within the province of the jury," and "[tihe basis of
the economist's testimony on this issue is speculative and does not relate in any specific
scientific way to this plaintiff." Id at *1.
Also in Augustin v. Hyatt Regency of New Orleans, No. CIVA..91-0670, 1992 WL
21823 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 1992), the same court excluded the testimony of the same econo-
mist. The plaintiff wanted to introduce hedonic damages after he was injured in an accident
at the Hyatt Regency Hotel "when a waiter dropped a tray that struck his ankle." Id at *1.
The Augustine court held that the testimony was excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in that "the probative value of Melville Wolfson quantifying loss of
enjoyment of life is substantially outweighed by the dangers of Rule 403." Id
Last, in Poster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1992),
the Court of Appeals of Louisiana excluded the testimony of Dr. Luvonia J. Casperson as
to hedonic damages. Id at 285. The court held that the testimony "would imply certainty in
an area where none exists and . . .would improperly invade the province of the jury." Id.
at 286.
118. Delong v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating, 332 S.E.2d 256, 258 (W. Va.
1985).
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giving consistency to verdicts, in the end the court should find that, as
Professor Stanley Smith admits, the "economists can present a probable
range for the value of life, but only the jury can decide where on that
range any given individual falls." 119
B. Wrongful Death Actions
The wrongful death action is a creature of statute whose origins
are patterned after an English statute known as Lord Campbell's
Act. ° The aim of wrongful death statutes was not to benefit the
personal character or "enjoyment of life" which the decedent lost, or
to compensate for the injury suffered by the decedent, but to compen-
sate the beneficiaries of the decedent for their losses."'
Yet, as the law evolved, the wrongful death statute and its aims
for compensation have taken on new perspectives. In wrongful death
actions, an argument for the introduction of expert testimony on he-
donic damages may be more clearly defined in that the state statute
either provides for hedonic damages or it does not.
Section 55-7-6 of the West Virginia Code specifies the allowable
damages for wrongful death, of which loss of enjoyment of life is not
specifically included.122 Under the statute, damages are allowed for
sorrow, mental anguish, loss of income, loss of services, expenses for
care, and reasonable funeral expenses. Of particular importance to the
hedonic argument is the provision which states that allowable damages
"may not be limited to" the damages specified in the statute.
119. Smith, supra note 27, at 72.
120. Walker v.'Walker, 350 S.E.2d 547, 549 (W. Va. 1986).
121. Id.
122. The West Virginia Code provides:
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for
the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society,
companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent; (B)
compensation for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent, and (ii)
services, protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent; (C) expenses for
the care, treatment and hospitalization of the decedent incident to the injury result-
ing in death; and (D) reasonable funeral expenses.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(1) (Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 95:10551082
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In Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 123 a wrongful death
action was brought in West Virginia against the defendant hospital and
the treating doctor on behalf of a two and one-half year old child who
died of a non-consensual biopsy." Plaintiff's counsel, in his closing
argument, made a number of analogies that could lead a juror only to
believe that the juror's job was to evaluate the decedent child's life in
terms of money."n The West Virginia court held that the jury made
an award which was excessive and that damages for loss of life was
not a permissible award in wrongful death actions. "Our wrongful
death statute... specifically sets forth in subsections (c)(1) and (2)
the losses for which damages can be recovered. Obviously, if the mea-
sure of damages were the value of a human life then, arguably, no
jury verdict could be excessive."12 6
In a more recent case, the argument against hedonic damages in
wrongful death actions was made in that the aim of a damage award
is supposed to be compensatory in nature for the benefit of the benefi-
ciaries. Thus, an award for hedonic loss would overcompensate plain-
tiffs (beneficiaries of the decedent), making it an award for the loss
suffered by the decedent, rather than a loss to the beneficiaries. "Our
statute ... allows an action for wrongful death based upon the loss
sustained by the beneficiaries of the recovery, rather than on the injury
suffered by the deceased or his estate."1"
123. 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
124. Id at 794-95.
125. Id at 799. The plaintiff's counsel in his closing argument compared the value of
the decedent's child's life to a race horse, to the price the military pays for aircraft and to
the space program. As an example, plaintiff's counsel argued "[a]nd what about our space
program? I'm proud of our country. 225,000,000 people, but when we made the decision to
go into space, a decision was made that not one single life would be sacrificed as a guinea
pig. The decision was made that we would bring our astronauts back. And billions have
been spent for all of the safety devices to insure that they come back." Id
126. Id at 799-800.
127. Walker v. Walker, 350 S.E.2d 547, 549 (W. Va. 1986); see also Singleton v.
Suhr, No. 55367, 1989 WL 54383, at *2 (Ohio CL App. May 18, 1989) (interpreting the
Ohio wrongful death statute, the Ohio appellate court held that expert testimony on hedonic
damages was impermissible because "the loss of enjoyment of life is a loss suffered by the
decedent and is an inappropriate element of damages in a wrongful death action which is
brought for- the exclusive benefit of certain surviving relatives for the damages they have
suffered").
1993] 1083
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Yet, more recently, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virgin-
ia revisited the issue of permissible closing arguments in a wrongful
death action in Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co.12 8 In Pasquale, the de-
fense made a motion for mistrial based on alleged improper remarks of
plaintiff's counsel during closing argument. 29 In the motion for mis-
trial, defense counsel argued that plaintiff's counsel asked the jury to
award damages to the beneficiaries of the estate based on the value of
the decedent's life; an argument claimed as an improper measure of
damages under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Statute.130 The de-
fense contended that the plaintiff's counsel's arguments were similar to
the impermissible closing arguments made in Roberts.
1 31
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Pasquale,
held that the value of a decedent's life is a permissible argument in a
wrongful death action.132 Stating that the "value of the decedent's
life" is somewhat a misnomer, the court held that "[tihere is no ques-
tion that West Virginia Code [section] 55-7-6, allows a jury to consid-
er the economic, social, and emotional losses sustained by the
decedent's beneficiaries .resulting from his wrongful death.' 3 Specif-
ically, the court held "[t]o this extent, the jury is in effect setting a
value on the decedent's life insofar as it relates to his or her benefi-
ciaries.'"' Accordingly, the court has signaled that in a wrongful
death action, the value of the decedent's life is a permissible argument,
and simple lost wage, pecuniary arguments are not the only monetary
way in which beneficiaries can recover in a wrongful death action. 35
128. 418 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1992).
129. Id at 753.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 125.
132. Pasquale, 418 S.E.2d at 753-56.
133. Id. at 753.
134. I
135. Although this may appear to open the door to an argument that hedonic damages
are allowed in wrongful death cases, the Pasquale court did not go that far. The Pasquale
opinion still reads that the focus of wrongful death damages rests on how the loss, "relates
to his or her beneficiaries." Id Expert testimony on hedonic damages would, on the other
hand, focus on how the damage affected the decedent-that is how the decedent lost his or
her enjoyment of life. This is impermissible. Since 1914, the West Virginia courts have
allowed counsel to argue to the jury that they are allowed to consider "the decedent's age,
earning capacity, experience and habits." But again, it is permissible only to focus on the
1084 [Vol. 95:1055
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The Pasquale court also held that it is impermissible for plaintiff's
counsel to argue to the jury that the decedent's life was worth a spe-
cific dollar amount when compared to other objects. 13 6 The court cit-
ed the examples of Jackson v. Cockil1 137 and Roberts when in clos-
ing argument plaintiff's counsel compared the decedents' life to the
money paid for a racehorse, the salary of a baseball player, or space
program. The court held that "[t]his rule is simply an extension of the
general damages rule that forbids plaintiff's counsel from making mon-
etary comparisons that are not in evidence in order to inform the jury
of an overall dollar amount it should return."138 The court next dis-
tinguished Pasquale from Roberts by noticing two substantial differ-
ences. First, in Pasquale, the plaintiff presented evidence of actual
damages in addition to the funeral and related expenses by having an
expert testify about the loss of income suffered by the decedent's wife
and children by using the decedent's work-life expectancy.
13 9
The second distinguishing factor between Roberts and Pasquale
was that in Roberts, the plaintiff's closing argument emphasized dam-
ages, asking the jury to consider the value of the decedent's life com-
pared to objects with specific and substantial dollar values.' 40 In
Pasquale, plaintiff's counsel's closing arguments asked for a value of
the decedent's life compared to ephemeral, nonspecific objects. 141
decedent's life as it may affect his probable earnings, and it is still impermissible to focus
on the hedonic aspect of the decedent. See Yeater v. Jennings Oil Co., 84 S.E.2d 904, 905
(W. Va. 1914); Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539, syl. pt. 1 (W. Va. 1981).
136. Pasquale, 418 S.E.2d at 753.
137. 138 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1964).
138. Pasquale, 418 S.E.2d at 754. The court's ruling may signal that in closing argu-
ment, if hedonic evidence is allowed to bp established by expert testimony, and such testi-
mony is in evidence, plaintiff's counsel may be allowed to make specific reference to that
figure in their closing argument, that is to a specific monetary figure.
139. Id In fact, the jury awarded the exact amount estimated by the plaintiff's expert.
140. Id.
141. Id In Pasquale, the court cited statements of the plaintiff's counsel during closing
arguments:
In addition to economic loss, the plaintiff and family are entitled to, she and
the children are entitled to compensation for the loss of society and companionship
caused by the tragic death of their father and her husband, Michael Pasquale.
How can these be measured? How much is a father worth? How much is a
husband worth? How much is a loving father and a loving husband worth?
19931 1085
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The court also noted that in Pasquale defense counsel did not object
during the closing, but waited until closing argument was finished to
ask for a mistrial. Apparently, the court found this of great weight.
The court stated that a motion for a mistrial is a drastic remedy, and a
decision within the trial court's discretion, and because defendant's
counsel did not make a timely objection, the trial court's denial of the
mistrial motion was sustained.14
2
The court added that the defendants did not offer any instruction
to inform the jury that the plaintiff's damages could not be measured
by the value of a life, "i.e., that a human life is [not] worth a given
amount of money." 143 Accordingly; the court held that the value of
the decedent's life, as it affects the beneficiaries, is a permissible
element of a wrongful death action while the hedonic value of a
decedent's life is not admissible evidence. 144
To date, only a few states have allowed hedonic damages to be
awarded under their wrongful death statute. 145 A provision of the Ne-
vada Wrongful Death Statute allows for recovery of "damages for
pain, suffering or disfigurement of the decedent."'4 In reviewing the
Nevada Wrongful Death Statute, the Nevada federal district court, held
that hedonic damages can be recovered when it was "consciously expe-
rienced before death.""47 In Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc.' 48 a
Id. at 754 n.28. Yet again, as one can note, in this wrongful death action, the loss of en-
joyment of life examples used in closing argument focused on the effect to the beneficia-
ties, and did not focus on the loss as it affected the decedent.
142. Pasquale, 418 S.E.2d at 755-56. This ruling is apparently inconsistent with the
court's previous ruling in Roberts. See Roberts, 345 S.E.2d at 799 n.5.
143. IL at 756. This ruling may impliedly assert that hedonic damages cannot be intro-
duced in wrongful death actions.
144. Although not yet asserted in a case, this may open the door to an expert attempt-
ing to quantify the hedonic aspect of the beneficiaries' loss.
145. Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., 491 A.2d 389, 397 n.12 (Conn. 1985) (damag-
es under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-555 (Supp. 1988) include "compensation for the destruc-
tion of [a decedent's] capacity to.carry on and enjoy life's activities in a way she would
have done had she lived."); see also Johnson v. Inland Steel Co., 140 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (holding that hedonic damages are appropriate matters for inclusion in a wrongful
death suit under the Indiana Wrongful Death Statute). I at 372 (emphasis in original).'
146. Pitman v. Thorndike, 762 F. Supp. 870, 871 (D. Nev. 1991).
147. Id. at 873. The court did not address whether expert testimony would be allowed.
148. 747 F. Supp. 263 (D. Del. 1990).
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student died in a dormitory fire. The United States District Court for
the District of Delaware, in interpreting the Delaware wrongful death
statute, held that the hedonic value of the decedent's life could only be
expressed in terms of the decedent's pain and suffering before
death.149 A similar decision was made by a federal district court in
New Jersey in Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corp."50 There, the
court interpreted New Jersey's Wrongful Death Statute and Survival
Statute and held that hedonic damages are not available under the
Wrongful Death Statute, but are recoverable under the Survival Statute
for the decedent's pain and suffering before death.15
For the most part, unless a wrongful death statute can be read
expansively to include hedonic damages, they are usually not permitted
as an element of damages in a wrongful death case.' 52 It has been
149. Id. at 273. In Sturner, the court reserved its decision with regard to expert testi-
mony on hedonic damages, reserving the right to rule at trial, but did hold that under the
Delaware Statute, the hedonic damage of the decedent's life, regardless of pain and suffer-
ing "is inadmissible under Delaware's wrongful death statute, as either a distinct basis for
recovery or as a purported measure of the parents mental anguish." Id. at 274.
150. 734 F. Supp. 151 (D.NJ. 1989).
151. Id. at 156; see also Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1991).
152. See Simmons v. Hartford Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 574, 579-81 (E.D. La. 1992)
(under Louisiana Survival Statute and Wrongful Death Statute, hedonic damages are not
allowed); Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1326-27 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (Indiana
wrongful death statute does not provide for hedonic damages, but does provide for loss of
enjoyment of life before death); Brown v. Seebach, 763 F. Supp. 574, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(there is no cause of action for hedonic damages in Florida under the Florida wrongful
death statute); Ortega v. Plexco, 793 F. Supp. 298, 299-300 (D.N.M. 1991) (a claim for
hedonic damages is not recognized under New Mexico law); Gonzales v. City Wide Insu-
lation, Inc., No. 88-C-1299, 1990 WL 77525, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1990) (ilinois
wrongful death statute does not provide for recovery of hedonic damages in that statute is
to compensate for pecuniary losses); Bramlette v. Hyundai Motor Co., No 91-C-3635, 1992
WIL 213956, at *3-5, (N.D. IMI. Aug. 28, 1992) (Illinois wrongful death statute does not
allow for hedonic damages, Stanley Smith's hedonic damage expert testimony barred);
Buckhalter v. Burlington N. R.R., No. CIVA.C90-139-D-D, 1992 WL 236676, at *1-2
(N.D. Miss. Mar. 23, 1992) (Mississippi's wrongful death statute does not allow for hedonic
damages, Stanley Smith's testimony is speculative and unduly prejudicial); Soutldake Limou-
sine v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d at 678-82 (Indiana wrongful death statute does not allow for
hedonic damages, Stanley Smith's testimony excluded as not being helpful and invading the
province of the jury); Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d at 1244-47 (Indiana's wrongful death
and survival act did not allow for expert testimony on hedonic damages, Stanley Smith
proposed plaintiff's expert); Singleton v. Suhr, 1989 WL 54383, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May
18, 1989) (hedonic damages are inappropriate element of damages in a wrongful death
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long held that the wrongful death action is to compensate the benefi-
ciaries for their loss, and not for hedonic losses or the lost enjoyment
of life of the decedent. With the Pasquale case, the West Virginia
court has expanded permissible arguments in wrongful death cases, but
has continued to focus the allowable recovery on the losses of the
beneficiaries as opposed to the losses'of the decedent.5
Accordingly, the best argument for hedonic damages under the
West Virginia wrongful death statute would be to convince the trial
court to read the statute expansively in that the recoverable damages
are "not limited to" those specified in the statute and may include
hedonic damages. However, this appears to be a pretty tough sell in
light of Roberts and Pasquale. Even if hedonic damages were accepted
as allowable in a wrongful death action, there still lies the basic proof
and evidentiary standards presented in a personal injury action to be
confronted before such testimony will be admitted.
V. CONCLUSION
Hedonic damages is a new emerging theory being asserted by
injured plaintiffs. The concept of hedonic damages itself is not objec-
tional. In general terms, hedonic damages is the qualification of the
loss of enjoyment of life. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held in Flannery, it is a separate element of damages which a
jury may award.
action under Ohio law); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325, 328-29 (D.N.H. 1989)
(although New Hampshire wrongful death statute could be read expansively, hedonic damag-
es are not allowed because "[to allow for the enjoyment of continued life would mean an
entrance into a boundless field of arbitrary assessment." Id at 329.)
153. Some commentators have specifically disagreed with the majority of states'
wrongful death statutes which simply award damages based on a person's monetary standing
in life. That is, a wrongful death action for a doctor would be worth much more than a
wrongful death action of a person who is unemployed simply because the majority of
wrongful death statutes compensate the beneficiaries by a pure pecuniary or wage standard
of the decedent. By allowing loss of the value of life to be awarded to the beneficiaries, it
is argued that hedonic damages bring a more equal award to wrongful death damages. See,
e.g., Andrews J. McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in
Wrongfil Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1990).
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The most controversial aspect of hedonic damages is expert testi-
mony mathematically quantifying the monetary value of the hedonic
aspect of life. The aim of expert testimony is to aid the jurors in their
deliberations and to give them the best information to render an objec-
tive opinion. Yet, before such testimony can be admitted at trial, some
serious questions have to be fully addressed. Can the value of life
actually be measured? Are the expert's opinions based on solid eco-
nomic principles? Should we allow evidence as to the value of enjoy-
ment of life to be presented to the jury or should we rely solely on
the jury's collective wisdom to make this difficult determination? 54
Expert testimony on hedonic damages is receiving mixed reviews
throughout the country. For the most part, it has been rejected under
evidentiary rule 702 as being speculative or invading the jury's
province in that hedonic damages are for the trier of fact to assess a
value to life. Yet, as indicated in Mercado v. Ahmed, the best method
to have expert testimony admitted on hedonic damages is to prove the
reliability and validity of the economic principles and the theories
underlying the economic valuation of the loss of enjoyment of life.
If and until the reliability and validity of an expert's opinion on
hedonic damages can be thoroughly established, the best way to intro-
duce hedonic damages to the jury is for the attorney to know his
client, know their losses, and persuasively, passionately, and eloquently
argue the hedonic loss to the jury. However, understanding that courts
are mote willing to allow expert testimony to "aid" the jury's under-
standing under the liberal rules for the admissibility of expert opinion,
quantitative figures of hedonic damages may be on the horizon.
154. Additionally, an argument can be made that if an expert is allowed to quantify
the value of life and place a monetary figure on hedonic damages, why prohibit expert
quantification other general unliquidated damages, such as pain and suffering?
If an expert can value life based on the government standards of risk, why prohibit
an expert from attaching a figure to pain and suffering based on research studies of hospital
stays, pain medication, annual sales of pharmaceutical companies for aspirin, pain manage-
ment surveys, and physical therapists data. Surely, it must be easier to quantify pain as a
monetary figure because almost everyone has experienced pain, compared to no one being
able to fix a monetary figure to their life. The expert could then average out his figures,
and testify to an individual's pain tolerance based on an injury.
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Yet, the underlying concern throughout these arguments is the
recurring question, can anyone really value life? Philosophers, theolo-
gians, and scientists have pondered the question and are mystified as
to the answer. In the end, the true value of life may not rest on statis-
tics or mathematics, but the value of life, the hedonic value of life,
may be a decision which ultimately rests in the jury's deliberative
wisdom.
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